Block Based Medical Image Watermarking Technique for Tamper Detection
  and Recovery by Rayachoti, Eswaraiah & Edara, Sreenivasa Reddy
  
Block Based Medical Image Watermarking Technique for 
Tamper Detection and Recovery  
Eswaraiah Rayachoti
1






 CSE, VVIT 
Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, India 
 
2
 CSE, Acharya Nagarjuna University 




In this paper, we propose a novel fragile block based medical 
image watermarking technique for embedding data of patient 
into medical image, verifying the integrity of ROI (Region of 
Interest), detecting the tampered blocks inside ROI and 
recovering original ROI with less size authentication and 
recovery data and with simple mathematical calculations. In the 
proposed method, the medical image is divided into three 
regions called ROI, RONI (Region of Non Interest) and border 
pixels. Later, authentication data of ROI and Electronic Patient 
Record (EPR) are compressed using Run Length Encoding 
(RLE) technique and then embedded into ROI. Recovery 
information of ROI is embedded inside RONI and information 
of ROI is embedded inside border pixels. Results of 
experiments conducted on several medical images reveal that 
proposed method produces high quality watermarked medical 
images, identifies tampered areas inside ROI of watermarked 
medical images and recovers the original ROI. 
Keywords: Watermarking, ROI, RONI, RLE, Tamper Detection, 
Recovery. 
1. Introduction 
Exchange of medical images between hospitals located at 
remote places has become a natural practice of modern 
times. This exchange of medical images inflicts two 
restraints for the medical images:  the information has not 
been changed by unauthorized users and there should be 
evidence that the information belongs to the correct 
patient [1]. On the other hand transmission of patient data 
and his medical image separately through commercial 
networks like internet results in excessive transmission 
time and cost. Watermarking is one of the techniques 
used to deal with the above two concerns. 
 
Watermarking techniques have been classified into two 
categories namely spatial domain and frequency domain. 
This classification is based on the medium used for 
concealing the data in an image. In spatial domain 
watermarking techniques [7, 10, 11, 13], data is 
embedded directly into host image while data is inserted 
into transformed host image in frequency domain 
watermarking techniques [8, 9, 14]. Another 
categorization of watermarking technique is reversible 
and irreversible. In reversible watermarking technique [9, 
14, 17, 18], the host image can be recovered exactly at 
receiver side from watermarked image. Accurate recovery 
of host image is not possible in case of irreversible 
watermarking techniques [8, 15]. Reversible 
watermarking is more suitable for medical images [2]. 
 
Four types of watermarking methods are developed to 
protect digital images: Robust watermarking [3], Fragile 
Watermarking [4], Semi-Fragile Watermarking [5] and 
Hybrid Watermarking [6]. Robust watermarking methods 
are used for copyright protection of digital images as it is 
difficult to remove robust watermarks from digital 
images. Robust watermarks sustain intentional or 
unintentional attacks like scaling, compression, cropping 
and so on. Fragile watermarking techniques are best for 
checking authentication of digital images. Any 
modification or tampering removes fragile watermark 
from watermarked image. So, absence of watermark 
indicates that image has been tampered. Semi-Fragile 
watermarks survive only unintentional attacks. Hybrid 
watermarks are the amalgamation of fragile and robust 
watermarks. Here, robust watermarks are used for privacy 
control and fragile watermarks are used for the integrity 
control of the digital image. 
 
Most of the medical images contain two parts called ROI 
and RONI. From diagnosis point of view ROI part is more 
important. Care should be taken while hiding data into 
ROI part so that visual quality will not be degraded. At 
the same time any tampering to ROI has to be identified 
and the original ROI has to be recovered in order to avoid 
misdiagnosis and retransmission of medical image. The 
recovery data of ROI is generally embedded into RONI 
[10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19]. When any tamper is detected 
  
inside ROI of received watermarked medical image then 
the tampered area of ROI is replaced with the recovery 
data embedded inside RONI. 
 
In this paper, we are proposing a novel block based fragile 
medical image watermarking technique to achieve the 
following objectives. 
 
1. Identifying the presence of tampers inside ROI. 
2. Recovering the original ROI when it is tampered. 
3. Detecting tampers inside ROI and recovering original 
ROI using minimal size authentication and recovery 
data. 
4. Avoiding the process of checking ROI of the 
watermarked medical image for the presence of 
tampers when the ROI is not tampered. 
5. Embedding EPR of patient into the medical image.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
covers review literature, proposed method is explained in 
section 3; results are illustrated in section 4 and finally 
conclusion in section 5. 
2. Literature Review 
Number of watermarking techniques has been developed 
for detecting tampers in the ROI or in the entire 
watermarked medical image and recovering the original 
ROI or the entire medical image. Zain et al. [7] proposed 
a block based scheme, the medical image is segmented 
into 8×8 blocks and then a mapping is established 
between the blocks for embedding the recovery 
information of each block into its corresponding mapped 
block. Later, each block is further divided into four sub 
blocks of 4×4 size each and then a 9-bit watermark is 
generated for each sub block. The generated 9 bit 
watermark of each sub block is embedded into LSBs of 
first 9 pixels of the sub block in the corresponding 
mapped block. At receiver’s end, the watermarked 
medical image is divided into blocks of 8×8 size and then 
the mapping between the blocks is calculated as done in 
embedding procedure. Later, each block is further divided 
into four sub blocks of 4×4 size and then a 2-level 
detection scheme is applied for detecting tampered blocks. 
This 2-level detection scheme identifies tampered blocks. 
Where Level-1 detection is applied on sub-blocks of 
blocks and level-2 detection is applied on blocks. When a 
tampered block is detected, the corresponding mapped 
block is identified and then recovery data embedded in 
mapped block is extracted. This recovery data is used to 
replace the pixels in tampered block. Major drawbacks of 
this method are: 1) if both block A and its mapped block 
B are tampered then it is not possible to recover original 
image, 2) this method is not using any authentication data 
for the entire medical image to check directly whether the 
image is tampered. So, all blocks in the image have to be 
checked one after other to detect the presence of tampers. 
This checking process leads to wastage of time when the 
image is not tampered, 3) there is no provision for 
embedding EPR of patient into the medical image.  
 
Wu et al. [8] developed two block based methods. In the 
second method, JPEG bit-string of the selected ROI is 
generated and then is divided into fixed length segments. 
Later, the medical image is divided into blocks and then 
hash bits are calculated for each block excluding the block 
with ROI. This hash bits are used as authentication data 
of the blocks. In each block of image, hash bits of the 
block and one segment of JPEG bit-string of ROI are both 
embedded using robust additive watermarking technique. 
Then all blocks are combined to get watermarked medical 
image. At receiver’s end, the watermarked medical image 
is divided into blocks as done in embedding procedure. 
From each block, hash bits of the block and a segment of 
JPEG bit-string are both extracted. For each block, hash 
bits are calculated and then compared with the extracted 
hash bits to check whether the block is tampered or not. If 
the block with ROI is identified as tampered then the 
JPEG bit-string segments extracted from all blocks are 
used to recover the ROI. Disadvantages of this method 
are: 1) it is not possible to get original ROI as JPEG bit-
string of ROI is used to recover ROI when it is tampered 
with, 2) this method requires more number of calculations 
to generate recovery data of ROI and embedding it into all 
blocks of medical image, 3) the size of authentication data 
is large; for each block 150 bits are used, 4) there is no 
provision for embedding EPR of patient into the medical 
image. 
 
Chiang et al. [9] proposed two block based methods based 
on symmetric key cryptosystem and modified difference 
expansion (DE) technique. The first method has the 
ability to recover the whole medical image, where as the 
second method has the ability to recover only ROI of 
medical image. In the first method, the medical image is 
divided into 4×4 size blocks and then average of each 
block is calculated. Later, the averages of all blocks are 
concatenated and then encrypted using two symmetric 
keys k1 and k2 in order to increase the degree of security. 
Then, Haar wavelet transform is applied on all blocks to 
identify smooth blocks. The encrypted averages of all the 
blocks are embedded in the identified smooth blocks. At 
the receiver’s end, the embedded data is extracted from 
watermarked image and then decrypted using the keys k1 
and k2 to get the averages of all blocks. Later, averages 
  
are calculated for all blocks and then compared with 
extracted averages to detect tampered blocks. When a 
tampered block is detected then the pixels in tampered 
block are replaced with the extracted average of that 
block. The second method is same as the first method 
except that the bits of pixels in blocks of ROI are 
embedded instead of averages of all blocks in entire 
image. Pitfalls of these schemes are: 1) in the second 
method the size of authentication and recovery data is 
large; 128 bits for each block in ROI, 2) the two methods 
require more time for embedding data into medical image 
as all blocks of the medical image have to be transformed 
into frequency domain and then smooth blocks have to be 
identified for embedding data, 3) the two methods are not 
using any authentication data for the entire ROI or the 
entire image to check directly whether the ROI or the 
entire image is tampered. So, all blocks in the ROI or in 
the entire image have to be checked one after another to 
detect the presence of tampers. This checking process 
leads to wastage of time when the image is not tampered, 
4) there is no provision for embedding EPR of patient into 
the medical image. 
 
Liew et al. [10, 11] developed two reversible block based 
methods. In the first method, the medical image is 
segmented into two regions: ROI and RONI. Later, ROI 
and RONI are divided into non overlapping blocks of size 
8×8 and 6×6 respectively. Then, a mapping is formed 
between blocks of ROI to embed recovery information of 
each block into its mapped block. Each block in ROI is 
mapped to a block in RONI. This mapping is used to 
embed LSBs of pixels in a ROI block into its mapped 
RONI block. Then, the method implemented by Zain et 
al. [7] is applied only on ROI part of the medical image 
for detecting tampers inside ROI and recovering original 
ROI. The LSBs of pixels inside ROI are replaced with its 
original bits that were stored inside RONI to make the 
scheme reversible. Second method is same as first method 
except that the removed LSBs of pixels in blocks of ROI 
are compressed using Run Length Encoding technique 
before embedding into RONI blocks. Drawbacks of the 
two methods are: 1) if both block A and its mapped block 
B inside ROI are tampered then it is not possible to 
recover original ROI, 2) the two methods are not using 
any authentication data for the entire ROI to check 
directly whether the ROI is tampered. So, all blocks in the 
ROI have to be checked one after another to detect the 
presence of tampers. This checking process leads to 
wastage of time when the ROI is not tampered, 3) there is 
no provision for embedding EPR of patient into the 
medical image. 
 
Memon et al. [12] implemented a hybrid watermarking 
method. In this method, the medical image is segmented 
into ROI and RONI. Then, a fragile watermark is 
embedded into LSBs of ROI. RONI is divided into blocks 
of size N×N and then a location map indicating 
embeddable blocks is generated. A robust watermark is 
embedded into embeddable blocks of RONI using Integer 
Wavelet Transform (IWT). Later, the location map is 
embedded into LL3 of each block using LSB substitution 
method. Finally, ROI and RONI are combined to get 
watermarked image. At receiver’s end, the watermarked 
medical image is segmented into ROI and RONI. Then, 
the robust watermark is extracted from RONI and is used 
for checking authentication of image. Fragile watermark 
is extracted from ROI and checked visually to know 
presence of tampers inside ROI. Two disadvantages of 
this method are: 1) there is no specification of how the 
original ROI is recovered when the ROI is tampered, 2) 
the time complexity of this method is more as it has to 
generate location map before embedding data. 
 
Agung et al. [13] developed a reversible method for 
medical images whose ROI size is more compared to size 
of RONI. In this method, the original LSBs of all pixels in 
medical image are collected and then LSB in each pixel is 
set to zero. Later, the medical image is segmented into 
ROI and RONI regions. Then, ROI and RONI are divided 
into blocks of size 6×6 and 6×1 respectively. A mapping 
is formed between blocks of ROI for storing recovery 
information of each ROI block into its mapped ROI block. 
The removed original LSBs are compressed using RLE 
technique and then embedded into 2 LSBs of 6×1 blocks 
in RONI. At receiver’s end, the watermarked medical 
image is segmented into ROI and RONI as done in 
embedding procedure. Then, the method proposed by Zain 
[7] is applied only on ROI part to detect tampers inside 
ROI and recover original ROI. The original LSBs that 
were embedded in RONI are extracted and then restored 
to their positions to get the original medical image. This 
method has the same drawbacks as with methods 
proposed by Liew et al. [10, 11]. 
 
Qershi et al. [14] developed a reversible ROI based 
watermarking scheme. At sender’s end, the medical 
image is segmented into ROI and RONI. Later, data of 
patient and hash value of ROI are both embedded into 
ROI using technique developed by Gou et al. Compressed 
form of ROI, average values of blocks inside ROI, 
embedding map for ROI, embedding map for RONI and 
LSBs of pixels in a secrete area of RONI are embedded 
into RONI using the technique of Tian. Finally, 
information of ROI is embedded into LSBs of pixels in 
secrete area. At receiver’s end, ROI information is 
  
extracted from secrete area and is used to identify ROI 
and RONI regions. From the identified RONI region 
compressed form of ROI, average values of blocks inside 
ROI, embedding map of ROI, embedding map of RONI 
and LSB of pixels in secrete area are extracted. Using the 
extracted location map of ROI, patient’s data and hash 
value of ROI are extracted from ROI. Then, hash value of 
ROI is calculated and compared with extracted hash 
value. If there is a mismatch between the two hash values 
then the ROI is divided into 16×16 blocks. For each 
block, the average value is calculated and compared with 
the corresponding average value in the extracted average 
values. If they are not equal then the block is marked as 
tampered and replaced by the corresponding block of the 
compressed form of ROI. Two disadvantages of this 
method are: 1) extracting the embedded data from RONI 
without knowing the embedding map of RONI, 2) use of 
compressed form of ROI as recovery data for the ROI. 
 
Qershi et al. [15] proposed a scheme based on two 
dimensional difference expansion (2D-DE). At sender’s 
end, the medical image is divided into three regions: ROI 
pixels, RONI pixels and border pixels. Later, the 
concatenation of patient’s data, hash value of ROI, bits of 
pixels inside ROI and LSBs of border pixels is 
compressed using Huffman coding and then embedded 
into RONI using 2D-DE technique. This embedding 
generates a location map which will be concatenated with 
information of ROI and then embedded into LSBs of 
border pixels. At receiver’s end, from border pixels in the 
watermarked medical image both information of ROI and 
location map are extracted. Using this ROI information, 
ROI and RONI are identified. The extracted location map 
is used to extract patient’s data, hash value of ROI, bits of 
pixels inside ROI and LSBs of border pixels from RONI. 
The process for detecting tampered blocks is same as the 
one used in [14]. Each tampered block is replaced by the 
corresponding block of pixels in the extracted ROI. The 
LSBs of border pixels are replaced using the extracted 
LSBs from RONI. A major drawback of this scheme is it 
is applicable to only the medical images whose ROI size 
is very less (up to 12% of size of entire image). 
 
Qershi et al. [16] developed a hybrid ROI-based method. 
At sender’s end, the medical image is divided into three 
regions: ROI, RONI and border pixels. Later, patient’s 
data and hash value of ROI are embedded inside ROI 
using modified DE technique. The ROI location map 
along with compressed form of ROI and average 
intensities of blocks inside ROI are then embedded into 
RONI using DWT technique. Then, size of watermark 
that is inserted into RONI and ROI information are 
embedded inside border pixels using the same DWT 
technique. At receiver’s end, ROI information is extracted 
from border pixels and is used to identify ROI and RONI 
regions. Compressed form of ROI, average intensities of 
blocks in ROI and location map of ROI are extracted from 
the identified RONI region. Using the extracted location 
map of ROI, patient’s data and hash value of ROI are 
extracted from ROI. The procedure for detecting tampered 
blocks and recovering ROI is same as in [14]. Two 
disadvantages of this method are: 1) use of compressed 
form of ROI as recovery information for the ROI, 2) 
applicable to only images whose size is at least 512×512. 
 
Deng et al. [17] developed a region-based tampering 
detection and recovering method based on reversible 
watermarking and quad-tree decomposition. In this 
method, original image is divided into blocks with high 
homogeneity using quad-tree decomposition and then a 
recovery feature is calculated for each block using linear 
interpolation of pixels. The recovery features of all blocks 
are embedded as first watermark using invertible integer 
transformation. Quad-tree information as second layer 
watermark is embedded using LSB replacement. In the 
authentication phase, the embedded watermark is 
extracted and the original image is recovered. The similar 
linear interpolation technique is utilized to get each 
block's feature. The tampering detection and localization 
can be achieved through comparing the extracted feature 
with the recomputed one. The extracted feature can be 
used to recover those tampered regions with high 
similarity to their original state. One drawback of this 
scheme is exact original image cannot be recovered when 
it is tampered. 
3. Proposed Method 
To achieve the above mentioned objectives, we propose a 
medical image watermarking technique in this paper. 
3.1 Division of Medical Image 
In a medical image, the ROI is the most important part 
for making diagnosis. A medical image may contain 
several disjoint ROI areas and may be in different shapes. 
The ROI parts are marked by a physician or by a clinician 
interactively. Each ROI area is represented by an 
enclosing polygon. The enclosing polygon is 
characterized by the number of vertices and their 
coordinates. In proposed method, the medical image is 
segmented into three regions of pixels: ROI pixels, RONI 
pixels and border pixels as shown in Fig. 1. In present 
work, we use medical images containing a single ROI. 
The proposed method can also be used with medical 
  
images containing multiple ROI areas. In this method, the 




Fig. 1 Division of medical image into three regions. 
3.2 Hash value of ROI 
After selecting the ROI, the hash value of the ROI is 
calculated using the cryptographic hash function MD5. 
This function generates a unique code for any input and is 
a one way function. Determining the input from the code 
generated by MD5 is not possible. The calculated hash 
value of ROI is used to authenticate ROI. 
3.3 Run Length Encoding 
After calculating hash value of ROI, the ROI is divided 
into non overlapping blocks of size 4×4 and then average 
value is calculated for each block. A watermark is 
generated by concatenating hash value of ROI, LSBs of 
pixels inside ROI and EPR of patient. This generated 
watermark is compressed using RLE. RLE is a simple 
lossless compression technique and is used to reduce the 
size of watermark. Original data can be reconstructed 
exactly from the compressed data. In this technique, if a 
bit is repeating for number of times in sequence then that 
bit sequence is replaced by a count value and the bit. As 
an example, the binary data 000001111110000000 will be 
interpreted as five 0’s, six 1’s, seven 0’s and it is coded as 
(101, 0), (110, 1) and (111, 0). The original binary data 
containing 18 bits is compressed to 12 bits. The 
compressed watermark is encrypted using a secret key k1 
to provide security. The resultant watermark is embedded 
into LSBs of ROI pixels. 
3.4 Mapping between blocks of ROI and RONI 
After embedding watermark in LSBs of ROI pixels, RONI 
is divided into non overlapping blocks of size 3×3 pixels. 
Assuming that the number of blocks inside ROI is less 
than the number of blocks inside RONI, for each block in 
ROI the corresponding mapped block in RONI is 
identified using Eq. (1). 
 
1mod bROIRONI NBkB      (1) 
 
where Nb is the number of blocks in ROI, BRONI is block 
number in RONI, k is a secrete key and is a prime number 
between 1 and Nb, BROI is block number in ROI. After 
mapping each ROI block to a RONI block, the average 
value of each ROI block is embedded inside the 
corresponding mapped RONI block. 
 
Now, the detailed embedding algorithm is explained as 
follows. 
3.5 Embedding Algorithm 
1. Segment the original medical image into three 
regions: ROI pixels, RONI pixels and border pixels. 
2. Calculate hash value (h1) of ROI using MD5. 
3. Divide the pixels inside ROI into non overlapping 
blocks of size 4×4 each. 
4. For each ROI block, calculate average value and use 
it as authentication and recovery data of that block. 
5. Collect Least Significant Bits of all pixels inside ROI 
and denote this collection as B. 
6. Represent the characters in EPR of patient using 
ASCII code and then get binary equivalent of it, E. 
7. Generate watermark w by concatenating h1, B and E. 
8. Compress watermark w using RLE compression 
technique to generate wcomp. 
9. Encrypt the watermark wcomp using a secret key k1. 
10. Embed the bits of encrypted watermark into LSBs of 
pixels inside ROI. 
11. Divide RONI into non overlapping blocks of size 3×3 
each. 
12. Assuming that the number of blocks in ROI is less 
than the number of blocks in RONI, map each block 
in ROI to a block in RONI using Eq. (1). 
13. For each ROI block, calculate average intensity value 
and then embed into LSBs of first 8 pixels in mapped 
RONI block.  
14. Encrypt the bits indicating the information of ROI 
using secret key k1. 
15. Embed the encrypted bits into the LSBs of border 
pixels. 
3.6 Extraction Algorithm 
1. Extract the encrypted bits from the LSBs of border 
pixels in watermarked medical image. 
2. Decrypt the extracted bits to get information of ROI. 
3. Identify ROI pixels and RONI pixels in watermarked 
medical image. 
  
4. Extract the encrypted watermark from the LSBs of 
pixels inside ROI. 
5. Decrypt the extracted watermark to get wcomp. 
6. Decompress the wcomp to obtain the hash value (h1) of 
ROI, LSBs (B) of pixels inside ROI and EPR (E) of 
patient. 
7. Replace the LSBs of pixels inside ROI with the bits in 
B. 
8. Calculate hash value (h2) of the ROI using MD5. 
9. Compare h1 with h2. If h1=h2 then the ROI is 
authentic and the extraction process ends. 
10. If h1≠h2 then the ROI is not authentic and is 
tampered. Proceed to next step to detect tampered 
blocks inside ROI and recover original ROI. 
11. Divide ROI and RONI into blocks of size 4×4 and 
3×3 respectively. For each ROI block identify the 
mapped RONI block using Eq. (1) as in embedding 
procedure. For each ROI block, calculate average 
intensity and then compare it with the average 
intensity extracted from LSBs of first 8 pixels in the 
corresponding mapped RONI block. If they are not 
equal then mark the block as tampered and replace 
the pixels in this block with the extracted average 
value. 
4. Experimental Results 
We developed a MATLAB program for testing the 
performance of the proposed method. For conducting 
experiments, we used around hundred 8-bit grayscale 
medical images of different sizes and modalities like CT 
scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound. Out of these hundred 
images, 35 medical images are of CT scan, 40 medical 
images are of MRI scan and 25 medical images are of 
Ultrasound. Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) and 
Weighted Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (WPSNR) [20] are 
used to measure the distortion in the generated 
watermarked medical images.  
 
Higher value of PSNR and WPSNR designates less 
distortion in the watermarked image. Mean Structural 
SIMilarity index (MSSIM) [21] metric is used to measure 
the similarity between the original and the watermarked 
medical image. MSSIM value is between -1 and 1. Value 
1 of MSSIM indicates that the original and watermarked 
images are similar. Visual degradation in the 
watermarked image is measured using the Total 
Perceptual Error (TPE) [22] metric. Lower value of TPE 
indicates less degradation in the watermarked image.  
 
Some of the medical images used in our experiments are 
shown in Fig. 2. All images are resized to 256×256 and 
patient data of 0.5 KB size is embedded inside ROI. A 
rectangular shaped ROI is considered in each medical 
image for simulating the proposed method. Fig. 2 also 
shows the watermarked images generated after embedding 
watermark into original images and the watermark 
extracted or reconstructed medical images. There is no 
significant visual difference between the original, 
watermarked and watermark extracted medical images. 
Table 1 illustrates the results obtained after embedding 
watermark into the three medical images shown in Fig. 2. 
Table 2 depicts the average results obtained by 
watermarking the hundred medical images used in our 
experiments. Results shown in Tables 1 and 2 indicate 
that the proposed method works well for different 
modalities of medical images.  
 
A medical image watermarking technique is effective if 
the PSNR value of watermarked and reconstructed 
medical image is greater than 40 dB [23]. In the proposed 
method, The PSNR and WPSNR values of watermarked 
and reconstructed medical images are above 40 dB. The 
perceived change in the structural information of the 
watermarked medical images is insignificant as the 
MSSIM values for all modalities of images are near to 1. 
Similarly, the low average TPE values show less visual 
degradation in the watermarked medical images. 
 
The intruders are prevented from getting information of 
ROI by encrypting it before embedding inside border 
pixels. If an attacker identifies the ROI region and gets 
the LSBs of pixels inside ROI then he cannot do anything 
with that data as is encrypted by a secret key. Some of the 
state-of-the-art techniques [9, 10, 11, 13] are not using 
any authentication data, like hash value of ROI to check 
directly whether the ROI is tampered or not. So, all blocks 
inside ROI have to be checked one after the other to detect 
the presence of tampers. This checking process leads to 
wastage of time when the watermarked medical image is 
not tampered. Such wastage of time is not incurred in the 
proposed method as it is using hash value of ROI to 
directly check whether the ROI is tampered. 
 
To test the performance of proposed method in terms of 
detecting tampered blocks inside ROI and recovering 
  
 
Fig. 2. Original, watermarked and reconstructed medical images. From top to bottom: CT scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound images. 
 














PSNR WPSNR MSSIM TPE 
CT 200×192 42752 36348 2400 52.27 54.35 0.9347 0.0612 
MRI 132×176 27584 23440 1452 57.34 58.13 0.9635 0.0445 
US 104×128 17664 13072 832 60.56 63.21 0.9923 0.0221 
 











CT Scan 51.38 53.14 0.9216 0.0604 
MRI Scan 54.26 56.89 0.9714 0.0468 
Ultrasound 58.76 60.79 0.9851 0.0201 
 
original ROI, we induced a tamper inside ROI of the 
watermarked medical images as shown in Fig. 3. 
Proposed method identified the tamper inside ROI and 
recovered original ROI. 
 
The reconstructed medical images are shown in Fig. 4. In 
a medical image, the LSB of pixels inside RONI and 
border are generally zero. So, the LSB of pixels inside 
RONI and border are set to 0 after extracting embedded 
data from them.   
 
For testing the capability of proposed method in detecting 
tampers at multiple locations inside ROI and recovering 
original ROI, we modified pixels at number of locations 
inside ROI of watermarked medical images as shown in 
Fig. 5. Proposed method detected all the tampers inside 
ROI and recovered original ROI. Fig. 6 shows the 
reconstructed medical images. Some of the reviewed 
schemes [10, 11, 13] cannot recover ROI when tampers 
are induced by attackers at multiple locations inside ROI. 
Table 3 depicts the comparison between proposed method 
and the previously developed block based methods for 
tamper detection and recovery. 
  
 
Fig. 3. Watermarked medical images (from left to right: CT scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound) with a tamper inside ROI. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Recovered medical images (from left to right: CT scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Watermarked medical images (from left to right: CT scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound) with tampers at different locations inside ROI. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Recovered medical images (from left to right: CT scan, MRI scan and Ultrasound). 
 
Proposed method is developed based on the assumption 
that the intruders generally try to modify only the 
significant part, ROI, in the medical images during their 
transmission. So, identifying changes inside ROI and 
recovering original ROI must be done before using the 
medical image for diagnosis and to avoid misdiagnosis. 
One of the limitations of proposed method is: the RONI 
and border parts are not recovered exactly as LSBs of all 
pixels inside RONI and border are set to 0 after extracting 
embedded data from them. This limitation does not affect 
the efficiency of the proposed method as RONI and border 
parts of medical images are not significant for making 
diagnosis decisions.  Another limitation is: no security for 
the ROI recovery data that is embedded inside RONI. If 
the ROI is tampered then the original ROI can be 
recovered only when the RONI and border part of the 
watermarked medical image are not attacked by any noise 
or not modified by intruders or not processed by common 
image manipulation operations. 
4. Conclusions 
Proposed medical image watermarking method produces 
high quality watermarked medical images. The 
watermarked medical images look more similar to 
original medical images as PSNR, WPSNR values of 
watermarked medical images are above 50dB and MSSIM 
values are above 0.93. Proposed method can be used with 
medical images whose ROI part is up to 62% of entire 
image. Proposed method uses only 8 bit authentication 
and recovery data for each 4×4 block inside ROI. It 
identifies and localizes tampers inside ROI and recovers 
  
original ROI. When the extracted hash value of ROI 
matches with recalculated hash value of ROI, then the 
proposed method do not check the blocks inside ROI for 
detecting the presence of tampers. Computational 
complexity of proposed method is less as it uses simple 
mathematical calculations for generating authentication 
and recovery data, detecting tampered blocks inside ROI 
and recovering original ROI. 
 
For future enhancement, we try to extend the method for 
medical images whose pixels are represented using 10 or 
12 or 16 bits and also to sustain common attacks, reduce 
embedding distortion inside ROI and recover the pixels 








Size of authentication and 
recovery data 





Recovery of ROI/image when it is 
tampered 
Zain No 9 bits for each 4×4 block No 
Not possible if a block and its 
mapping block both are tampered 
Wu Yes 150 bits for each block No 
Possible, but with only compressed 
form of ROI 
Chiang Yes 128 bits for each 4×4 block No Yes 
Liew10,11 Yes 9 bits for each 4×4 block No 
Not possible if a block and its 
mapping block both are tampered 
Memon Yes - Yes No 
Agung Yes 9 bits for each 3×3 block No 
Not possible if a block and its 
mapping block both are tampered 
Qershi15 Yes 128 bits for each 4×4 block Yes Yes 
Qershi16 Yes - Yes 
Possible, but with only compressed 
form of ROI 
Deng No 8 bits for each block No Yes 
Our 
method 
Yes 8 bits for each 4×4 block Yes Yes 
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